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The Images of the Kamikaze
The kamikaze is one of the most prominent historical icons from the Asia Paciﬁc 
War.  The number of Japanese pilots who lost their lives was relatively small in rela-
tion to the total loss of the lives in the war, and the actual damage that they caused 
was almost inconsequential in the larger scheme of Japan’s war operations.1)  Divine 
wind—the literal translation of kamikaze—did not blow across the Paciﬁc to rescue 
Imperial Japan from the Allied Forces’ methodical advancement.  Yet the young men’s 
determination to sacriﬁce their lives for the nation still captures the popular imagina-
tion not only in Japan but also in the United States.  The name kamikaze has gained 
wide circulation, connoting fanatic behavior.2)  Most recently, the terrorist attacks on 
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, immediately 
conjured up images of the kamikaze attacks of more than a half-century ago.
However, the ubiquity of kamikaze images has not assured a uniformity in the in-
terpretation of those images within the two national cultural spaces.  The historical 
ﬁgures of the kamikaze has been displaced by one set of images in the United States, 
and by another in Japan, in order to conﬁgure the symbolic meaning of the two coun-
tries’ nationhood in relation to the war that they fought against each other more than 
six decades ago.  The contrary images of the kamikaze that circulate in the two na-
tions’ media attest to the United States’ and Japan’s contrasting strategies in transform-
ing the memories of their violent conﬂict.  Although they managed to overcome their 
mutual animosity, they still stand a distance away from each other in signifying their 
shared past.
The problematic images of the kamikaze illustrate the two nations’ postwar relation, 
central to which has been the memory of their past conﬂict.  The kamikaze images 
have functioned as a device to keep the other at a safe distance, while fulﬁlling a nar-
cissistic desire for self-assurance.  The mirror of the kamikaze is double-sided, so to 
speak, and stands between Japan and the United States.  The two nations gaze at the 
images of themselves reﬂected on its surface rather than looking at what lies behind 
the mirror.  The purpose of the present inquiry is not to shatter this mirror but to dem-
onstrate the degree to which images of the kamikaze have been an integral part of the 
two nations’ self-images.  In other words, there are no “real” kamikaze ﬁgures waiting 
to be rescued from these ideological conﬁgurations.  Their self-deaths were always dis-
cursively signiﬁed: facing their rejection of the conventional war ethics, the two societ-
ies anxiously responded by ﬁlling the symbolic void with trite images.  What follows is 




an attempt to document the structure of these images with a broad stroke within the 
two separate national cultural spheres.  In so doing, the essay focuses on the years 
since the end of the Cold War when the ideological foundation of U.S.-Japan relations 
has been seriously challenged.  This is an effort to historicize the persistent presence of 
the kamikaze in today’s popular imagination.
In the United States
Memories of their violent past are at the foundation of postwar U.S.-Japan relations. 
The war that the two countries fought and the way they ended the belligerency had 
decisive effects on the two countries’ relations as well as on their self-deﬁnitions in the 
postwar period.  By complicitly creating and accepting the narrative that the United 
States rescued Japan from the menace of its own militarism and converted it into a 
democratic nation, the two countries managed to transform themselves from hated en-
emies during the Asia Paciﬁc War to close allies within a few years of the war’s conclu-
sion.  Japan transformed itself into a good enemy by accepting the U.S. hegemony in 
East Asia, but the good enemy is still an enemy not to be completely trusted.  The nar-
rative of rescue and conversion remains anchored in memories of the past conﬂict.3) 
This narrative, which still largely deﬁnes popular perceptions of U.S.-Japan relations, 
requires paradoxical thinking: in order for this narrative of rescue and conversion to 
be convincing, Japan must always be at the moment of conversion from an evil “oth-
er” to a democratic, Americanized country.
In the 1990s, the decade following the end of the Cold War, the two nations’ rela-
tions went through turbulent changes despite their close economic ties.  With the Sovi-
et Union gone from the political map, the U.S. media rediscovered Japan as a favored 
target of criticisms.  It initially cast Japan as an economic threat and later (when Japan 
plunged into a recession) denounced it for its war crimes during the Asia Paciﬁc War. 
Although the narrative of rescue and conversion still remained intact, the fall of the 
“evil empire” lessened the need to characterize Japan as “one of us,” among the good. 
The images of the kamikaze pilots that had marked the problematic past between the 
two countries were also transformed, reﬂecting the changing perceptions of Japan in 
the American media.
Tom Clancy’s 1994 novel, Debt of Honor, combines the images of a Japan that is an 
economic giant that has become too powerful for its own good and of a Japan that still 
struggles under the weight of its war legacies.4)  Clancy’s 990-page book attests to the 
persistent anxiety about Japan in the American popular consciousness: Is Japan a 
friend or foe?  Having the former enemy as a closest ally produces an anxiety-ridden 
attitude in the American popular media, which often settles this anxiety by portraying 
Japan as an enemy despite the two countries’ seemingly friendly relations.  This U.S. 
anxiety is also projected onto the Japanese.  American distrust of Japan is displaced by 
Japanese hostility toward the Unites States in popular expressions.  The question of 
whether Japan is a friend or foe is therefore answered by a historical determinism: the 
Japanese are not to be trusted because they are still acting hostilely toward us (they 
must still be resentful for losing that war).  Clancy’s book faithfully replicates this logic 
in Debt of Honor.
Raizo Yamata is Japan’s most powerful industrialist, whose parents were killed in 
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Saipan during the war.  Fifty years later, having become powerful enough to manipu-
late the Japanese government and the world ﬁnancial market, Yamata launches a full-
scale assault on the United States in order to seek revenge for his parents’ death.  Ja-
pan’s Self-Defense Forces occupy Guam and Saipan, while Yamata’s men assault the 
U.S. ﬁnancial market with a computer virus and large-scale market manipulations.  Ja-
pan has also developed nuclear missiles, which become an enormous threat in the 
post-Cold War world where the United States and Russia bilaterally destroy their nu-
clear stockpiles.  In the end, as easily expected, the U.S. political and military leaders 
outmaneuver their Japanese counterparts and the crisis is averted.  Yamata is arrested, 
while the good Japanese (the former Prime Minister, who was ousted from his ofﬁce 
because he refused to go along with the Yamata’s plan) is rescued by American intelli-
gence agents.  However, while the plot, crammed with technical details, announces 
the U.S.’s victory, it ends with a big surprise: the JAL pilot, Torajiro Sato plunges his 
747 into the Capitol building killing the President of the United States as well as a 
number of congressmen.
Sato witnesses his brother killed in action when he happens to ﬂy his jetliner over 
the Mariana waters while the battle takes place.  In order to punish the United States 
for killing his brother, he seeks to paralyze the United States political system.  Like so 
many Japanese characters in the book, Sato’s character is grossly underdeveloped: he 
is an automaton driven simply by his anger.  His ﬁnal thought before crashing into the 
U.S. Capitol building was: “if they [the U.S. president and congress] could kill his fam-
ily and disgrace his country, then they would pay a very special price for that.” 5)  Just 
as the anthropologist Ruth Benedict sought the key to decode enigmatic Japanese be-
havior in the concept of guilt ﬁve decades earlier, Tom Clancy ﬁnds an answer to his 
own characters’ vengeful acts in a rigid cultural code of honor.  A chain of events, 
from Yamata’s parents’ death in Saipan to Sato’s brother’s death in the Mariana wa-
ters, directly link Sato’s ﬁnal act to the Asia Paciﬁc War.  The Japanese ﬁnally pay back 
the “debt of honor” that they accumulated half a century earlier.
Although Clancy does not use the term “kamikaze” to describe Sato’s suicide at-
tack, Sato’s ﬁnal act serves in Clancy’s ﬁction, like the kamikaze in American popular 
representation more generally, as a tool to mark the inscrutable nature of “Japanese” 
thinking.  The indeterminacy of Japan’s status—as friend or as foe—in the American 
popular consciousness is expressed as the U.S.’s fear toward Japan.  Clancy invokes 
the fanaticism of the kamikaze attacks in order to demonstrate that the U.S.’s present 
fear of Japan is not entirely groundless.  The feasibility of the attack, combined with 
the historical precedence of the kamikaze, brings the contemporary Japanese back to 
the war that the two countries once fought so ﬁercely.
The book’s ending shows an eerie resemblance with an historical event in more re-
cent time—9/11.  Indeed, in the frenzied media coverage of the event in 2001, numer-
ous references were made to the kamikaze.  In 1994, Japan was still a menace to U.S. 
security in the popular ﬁction, while the attacks on the World Trade Center towers and 
Pentagon seven years later presented the United States with the new enemies: Middle 
Eastern terrorists.  Yet, in this resonance between ﬁction and history, Japan’s image as 
an evildoer was quietly invoked to anchor the unprecedented attack on the U.S. into a 
familiar historical narrative.  Memories of the two nations’ conﬂict and its resolution 
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pointed to a reassuring trajectory for the post-9/11 United States: The unprecedented 
attack on the United States will inevitably lead to its triumph.
With the Soviet political system subverted and the Japanese economy safely con-
tained, the U.S. seemed to have attained a great degree of security.  Yet there was still 
nostalgia in the United States for the time when America’s enemies were clearly 
identiﬁable, as well as a need to explain how America became the ﬁnal winner of his-
torical progress (i.e. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man).  Released 
ostensibly to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack by Jap-
anese forces, the ﬁlm Pearl Harbor (2001) offers a narrative that satisﬁes both the nos-
talgic desire for enemy ﬁgures and the rationale for the U.S.’s present success.6)  By 
not only identifying with but also outmaneuvering the aggressors in their own games, 
Americans defeated their enemies.  The ﬁlm portrays Americans as the underdog and 
praises their willingness to sacriﬁce their lives for their nation.  In the end, it turns out 
that American Army pilots embody the kamikaze spirit better than their Japanese 
counterparts.  The episode of the ﬁrst U.S. air raid on Japanese cities lead by Colonel 
James Doolittle (Alec Baldwin) on April 18, 1942, is grafted onto the plot in order to 
end with a story of American heroism.
A domestic conﬂict—the love rivalry between Rafe McCawley (Ben Afﬂeck) and 
Danny Walker ( Josh Hartnett)—is suspended in the face of the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  The Mitsubishi Zero ﬁghters that ﬂy over their heads instantaneously 
reunite the two men who have jeopardized their long-standing friendship in their ﬁght 
over a common love interest.  Both Rafe and Danny are subsequently recruited to 
participate in the raid.  Doolittle’s pronouncement to his men describes the nature and 
the purpose of the mission they are about to engage in.  Facing the airmen recruited 
for the mission, Doolittle announces and then asks: “The mission I’m asking you to 
volunteer for is exceptionally dangerous.  Take a look at the man beside you.  It’s a 
good bet that in the next six weeks, you or he will be dead.  Everyone brave enough 
to accept this, step forward.”  A close-up shot of their feet captures their forward 
movement in unison.  Cut to the next scene, the heroic ﬁgures of Doolittle and his 
men walk out of the hangar in a low-angle shot.  Through the patchwork of these short 
segments, the ﬁlm hastily portrays Doolittle’s men as free-willing individuals who par-
ticipate in the dangerous mission out of their own volition.  The underlying subtext is 
that their decision based on free will differentiates the American combatants from 
their Japanese counterparts.  The ﬁlm intimates that, mired in “traditional” ethics, the 
Japanese possess merely a collective self, devoid of individuality.
Aboard on aircraft carrier Hornet en route to Japan carrying Doolittle’s crew and 
their B-25s, Doolittle assures Rafe and Danny of the meaning of their mission.  As if to 
repress his own anxiety, Doolittle preaches the mission’s meaning to the two young 
men:
 Dolittle: What’s going on?
 McCawley: We only have sixteen planes.
 Dolittle: So?
 McCawley:  When the Japs hit us, they have more than 300.  I mean, how much 
difference are we really gonna make?
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 Walker:  Not that we are afraid, sir.  We might die doing this.  We want to 
know what it’s for.
 Doolittle:  You know at Pearl, they hit us with a sledge hummer.  This raid, 
even if we make it through, it will only be a pinprick.  But it will be 
straight through their hearts.  Victory belongs to those who believe 
in it the most, believe in it the longest.  We’re gonna believe.  We’re 
gonna make America believe.
It is hard not to respond to Doolittle’s assertion with rhetorical questions.  Did many 
in Japan not believe in their victory just as long?  In desperation, did the kamikaze pi-
lots not resort to rhetoric similar to Doolittle’s to ﬁnd meaning in their seemingly 
pointless mission?
The simple determination of Doolittle makes his mission a precursor of the kamika-
ze, appropriating the Japanese dedication for the cause as his own.  In the meeting on 
Hornet right before their takeoff, after announcing that he is also participating in the 
raid, Doolittle answers the anxious airmen’s questions:
 An airman:  What do we do if our planes are damaged and we have to bail 
out over Japan?
 Doolittle:  Well, in that situation, I can’t tell you what you should do.
 Capt. McCawley:  What would you do, Colonel?
 Doolittle:  I wasn’t built to be a prisoner.  So I would have my crew bail 
out.  I would ﬁnd the sweetest military target I could and drive 
my plane right smack into the middle of it and kill as many 
those bastards as I possibly could.  But that’s just me.  I’m for-
ty-ﬁve years old.  I’m an old man.  You guys have a whole life 
ahead of you.  So what you should do is up to you.
Doolittle’s heroism is exempliﬁed in his willingness to sacriﬁce his life.  He intends to 
set an example to be followed: he would not object, if any of his men and others 
would follow in his footsteps (granted they make their decisions voluntarily) by 
sacriﬁcing their lives for the nation.7)
It is easy enough to see the resemblance between these American pilots in the ﬁlm 
and the kamikaze.  A number of Japanese men “volunteered” for their suicide mis-
sions with just as little, vague information about them:8) at least in the initial stage of 
the kamikaze missions, the participants were in principle recruited on voluntary bas-
es.9)  The kamikaze missions were desperate appeals to the nation that “victory be-
longs to those that believe in it the most, believe in it the longest.”  The Japanese pilots 
were trying to destroy, as the Alec Baldwin character puts it, “the sweetest military tar-
get” they could ﬁnd in exchange for their lives.  In case the audience may miss the 
point of Doolittle’s explanations, Captain McCawley later utters to himself that “this 
really was a suicide mission” as he and his crew desperately try to make it to China af-
ter the raid.  The ﬁlm thus transforms Doolittle and his men into the American version 
of the kamikaze in 2001.
The ﬁlm was also designed to be the ﬁnal homage to memories of the last systemat-
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ic attack on the United States at that point.  During and in the lingering heat of the 
dotcom boom, it appeared that external threats to United States security had all but 
vanished: the Cold War was long over, the recessionary Japanese economy was safely 
contained by U.S. monetary policy, and Y2K turned out to be a complete dud.  Mili-
tary conﬂicts in which the U.S. intervened during the 1990s and the ﬁrst months of 
new millennium seem to have lacked a serious impact on the U.S. mainland.  In 
Rwanda, Kosovo, or elsewhere, the locals were killing themselves, not U.S. citizens: 
the U.S. was not the primary target of their attacks.  Bill Clinton’s sex scandal gar-
nered at least as much coverage in the American media as any international conﬂict. 
The Asian ﬁnancial crisis, though serious, never threatened the euphoric mood of the 
U.S.’s newly found prosperity.  In other words, at the turn of the millennium, the Unit-
ed States seemed to be celebrating the end of history, where no serious dialogic rela-
tion with the other is required.
Yet the receding outside threats simultaneously unmasked the underlying fear of the 
internal threats.  The media images from the 1993 F.B.I. siege of the Branch Davidians 
religious sect in Waco, Texas, and the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing vividly demon-
strated grave ﬁssures in American society.  The enemies were among “us.”  There is a 
great comfort in reminiscing about the days when it was clear who the enemies were, 
particularly when these enemies would in the end succumb to U.S. hegemony.  In 
such an era, Americans could set aside their differences, as in the case of Rafe and 
Danny, and unite in the battle against the common enemy.
In all, Pearl Harbor is an effort to explain the position of the United States in early 
2001—how it has gotten to where it is as the winner of all historical struggles.  Al-
though Japan manages to threaten the U.S.’s national security, its surprise attack mere-
ly awakens Americans to their values and their determination to defend them.  By be-
coming and thus appropriating the kamikaze—what is widely regarded as most 
Japanese—the American characters deny their enemies their privileged place in histo-
ry.  Americans are just as brave and fearless as the kamikazes; and they are destined to 
win the competition because their bravery is based on their free will.  Lacking any se-
rious intent to engage with the aggressor, the ﬁlm comfortably portrays Japan as a na-
tion of automatons.  The Japanese are deprived of their historical agency (there is only 
one free person in Japan—the emperor—just as Hegel says of Asian despotism), 
while the Americans defend their nation out of their own volition.  The historical 
agents of the democratic nation are destined to defeat the country without history; this 
dialectics is the sine qua non for the United States to reach the end of history: the con-
ditions of the United States in the late 1990s.  Pearl Harbor evokes the United States’ 
victory over Japan to validate this historical trajectory.
The 9/11 attacks literally shook the United States out of its sense of security with 
easily identiﬁable enemy actions.  As a jetliner repeatedly rammed into the World 
Trade Center on television screens, the images of the menacing other returned to the 
American popular consciousness.  With ease, the American media compared the at-
tacks to the kamikaze (as well as to the Pearl Harbor attack).  Japan and its history 
were invoked in the media’s strong emotional responses to the events.  Of course 
there were more levelheaded commentaries that emphasized the differences between 
the two attacks (the military targets versus the civilian targets; military attacks verses 
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hijacks, etc.).  Inscrutable Arab men moved into the position of the menacing other 
from which Japan had been removed.  The fanatic images of the kamikaze brieﬂy re-
turned only to be displaced by those of Middle Eastern terrorists.  The images of the 
inscrutable Japanese who are perpetually plotting against American interests, pre-
served by the American media, immediately served to describe the newly found ene-
mies of the United States.
Memories of the war against the Japanese empire also returned to the site of de-
struction through another powerful icon: “ground zero.”  The destruction of the World 
Trade Center buildings created a strong association with nuclear devastation.  Yet few 
references were made to the actual experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. 
It appears that the dubious argument about the relationship between the kamikaze 
and the atomic bombs (to counter the fanaticism of the kamikaze, the bombs’ unprec-
edented power was used) short-circuited in the American media, squeezing out the 
history of Japan all together.  Distant memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki return to 
the U.S. media not as the effects of the U.S. retaliations on the Japanese attacks but as 
the condition that requires such retaliations.10)  The designation of “ground zero” pos-
its the tragedy of 9/11 as the beginning of a new phase of human history, while being 
silent about the destruction of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki rendered by the 
American hands.11)
Another image at the site of terrorist attacks similarly makes clear the de-historiciz-
ing effect of the association between World War II images and 9/11.  The widely circu-
lated image of the ﬁreﬁghters in New York (Figure 1), through its graphic reference to 
the Marines’ ﬂag-raising on Iwo Jima in 1945 (Figure 2), warps the progression of his-
torical time.  The Iwo Jima photo marked the capture of the island after a long, 
difﬁcult battle against determined Japanese defense forces, while the appeal of the 
2001 image hinges on its promise of an eventual American triumph over terrorists.  To 
put it simply, much as the designation of “ground zero” does, the association between 
the two images empties out the historical actuality of the battle that the Americans 
Figure 1
Photo by Thomas E. Franklin/The Bergen Record
Figure 2
Photo by Joe Rosenthal/The Associated Press
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waged against the enemy forces.  The United States is destined to prevail, while the 
process through which Americans will reach that victory does not receive serious con-
siderations.  These American references to World War II events hence connote that 
the destruction in New York City was the beginning of a history that will end with U.S. 
triumph.12)
In this new phase of history, the United States desperately seeks to comprehend the 
ﬁgure of the other in order to carry out its campaign and subsequent occupation.  The 
past dealings with Japan, as problematic as they have been, still supply the American 
popular media with guidelines on how to handle the other.  For example, On July 19, 
2003, The New York Times carried an article by Alexander Stille, which claimed there 
was an urgent need for an anthropological study on defeated Iraq, citing the work of 
Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946).13)  Stille’s demand for a cultur-
al knowledge of Iraq treats the situations in the two defeated nations as interchange-
able, while reducing their cultures to sets of rudimentary customs and beliefs.14)  Japan 
has become a safe place (it has been tamed) where Americans go in and appropriate a 
piece of the other (or culture) as their own.  The ﬁlm Pearl Harbor already tried out this 
strategy of identiﬁcation with the other.
A more recent example, The Last Samurai (2003), deploys it in a more blatant form: 
Captain Nathan Algren (Tom Cruise) turns out to be the last embodiment of the genu-
ine samurai (read kamikaze) spirit.  It is perhaps possible to read the story of The Last 
Samurai as an answer to the popular American desire to fully understand and contain 
the inscrutable other: the exotic treatment of the Japanese in the ﬁlm makes most 
sense when the viewer replaces in his or her imagination the Japanese samurai with 
the Taliban.
As Japan remains low on the terrorist nation list (also excluded from George Bush’s 
axis of evil) at the moment, there is little practical need to grapple with fanatic images 
of the Japanese today.  Nonetheless, The Last Samurai insists on representing the story 
of how Japan was transformed into a democratic country through the help of an 
American character.  Although corrupt bureaucrats manipulate the imperial institution 
for personal gain in the early years of Meiji, the emperor eventually awakes to the tra-
ditional values of Japan, which happen to be compatible with democracy, thanks to 
the intervention of American ofﬁcer Nathan Algren (the Tom Cruise character).  Al-
gren earns the right to represent the dying breed of traditional samurai by ﬁghting 
with them in the battle against the new government forces.  Faced with forces 
equipped with modern Western weapon, their act is simply suicidal.  Yet the samurai 
ﬁght to the last man in order to maintain their honor and integrity.  As the sole survi-
vor of the rebellious force, Algren appears in the imperial court and urges the Meiji 
emperor to stand up for the people against the control of an evil bureaucrat.15)  Pre-
dictably, the emperor wakes to his real mission of caring for the Japanese and dismiss-
es the most powerful bureaucrat, O¯mura.  Japan returns to the right historical trajecto-
ry through the sacriﬁce that the samurai make.  Like their predecessors who killed 
themselves to admonish their feudal lords, the samurai in the ﬁlm make the ﬁnal state-
ment through their deaths.  Yet the American character alone successfully delivers 
their desperate message to the Meiji emperor.
It is obvious that there is no place for the anachronistic samurai in the new society 
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and they make an honorable exit through a ﬁnal battle against the Meiji government’s 
conscripted army.  Through their deaths, they transform themselves into the ideal ene-
mies of the new regime: the newly purchased machine guns easily overcome the de-
termined samurai on the battleﬁeld in traditional armor.  The samurai’s determination 
to die in the ﬁlm is merely a reﬂection of the popular desire to tame and contain the 
enemy ﬁgures: the only good enemy is dead enemy, and the samurai ﬁnd their raison 
d’être in honorable death.  In the name of resistance, the samurai willingly succumb to 
the weapons of the new regime.  It would be so much easier for the American forces if 
only Taliban and al-Qaeda members were willing to die for their honor like the samu-
rai.  The awe that the conscript soldiers demonstrate toward the dead samurai at the 
end of the battle is mixed with appreciation that they have died so easily.  The audi-
ence can in the end appreciate a piece of the other at a safe distance through the ﬁgure 
of Nathan Algren.
The various reincarnations of the kamikaze in the U.S. media attest to the fascina-
tion with their willingness to sacriﬁce themselves for a larger cause.  Although the ka-
mikaze may embody the radical otherness that deﬁes comprehension—the paragon 
of the inscrutable other—in the American popular imagination, its circulation in the 
American imagination ironically has transformed the kamikaze into a “familiar” sign 
of the “unfamiliar.”  Accordingly Japan, the country from which the operation origi-
nated, has turned into a safe territory where the menacing other can be tamed and 
consumed by and for the American audience.  Some representational strategies are 
more successful than others (for example, The Last Samurai did much better in ticket 
sales than Pearl Harbor).  Yet these popular works collectively outline the structure of 
desire that kept the image of Japan in circulation.  The ﬁgure of the kamikaze in the 
post-Cold War United States ultimately reveals the nation’s underlying cultural anxi-
ety over its ever-shifting relation with the exterior world.  The historical icon invites 
the audience back to the good old days when the boundaries were clear and secure.
In Japan
When we turn our attention to the symbolic meaning of the kamikaze in Japan, the 
picture looks radically different.  Kamikaze images serve less as a symbol of Japan’s 
relation with the outside than as an icon that assures Japan’s self-identity.  The stories 
of kamikaze have been produced and circulated exclusively as Japanese dramas, in 
which the ﬁgures of others—the enemy combatants who were injured or killed by the 
kamikaze—are distinctively absent.  Sheltered from the outside world, the tenet of the 
kamikaze narratives has remained constant in postwar Japan, reﬂecting little of the 
changes in the international conditions surrounding Japan.  The end of the Cold War 
and September 11 caused only minor modiﬁcations in the Japanese narratives of the 
kamikaze.16)
In contrast to the hyper-aggressive images that remain largely intact outside Japan, 
the Japanese images of the kamikaze have been feminized in the postwar period. 
They have been portrayed in the popular media not as violent ﬁgures but as contem-
plative youths who struggled to accept their fates.  The militarists mercilessly sacriﬁced 
their young lives for the sake of the nation.  That many of them were either students 
or graduates of higher educational institutions has helped to promote the images of 
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the kamikaze as victims of the war.  Their image as liberal intellectuals places them at 
a distance from the fanatic nationalism of the time, while the numerous writings (dia-
ries and letters) that they left offer a glimpse into their struggle with their fates.  Fur-
thermore, through quietly accepting their destiny as their own, they died as “true” pa-
triots who exercised their historical agency (they chose to die for their country).  The 
kamikaze pilots were victims yet were able to remain historical agents through their 
decision to die as patriots.17)  By casting a sympathetic gaze on the plight of the young 
pilots, postwar Japanese society has appropriated their status as victim-cum-agent.
We see the emotional contents of this discourse at display most vividly at the Peace 
Museum for Kamikaze Pilots in Chiran, Kyu¯shu¯.  The facility is dedicated to the 1,036 
pilots who departed from the southern Kyu¯shu¯ airbases, including the Chiran Army 
Airbase, for their ﬁnal missions over Okinawan waters in 1945.  Each year, the muse-
um that stands at the site of the former Chiran Army Airbase receives about 700,000 
visitors.  The 2001 ﬁlm, Hotaru, which takes as its theme the postwar lives of the for-
mer kamikaze pilots, has provided publicity to the small town that operates the facility. 
The main focus of the museum’s display is to trace the lives of individual pilots at their 
ﬁnal moment through their photos, writings, and personal belongings.  In their own 
personal struggles to reconcile themselves to their imminent death, the young pilots 
appear less as fearless warriors than as tragic, yet courageous, ﬁgures inside the display 
cases of the museum.  The Peace Museum is a space where one is invited to encounter 
death contained in slick glass cases (and appreciate one’s life).
By shedding tears over the emotional displays at the museum, visitors momentarily 
identify with the suffering of the pilots (thus they afﬁrm the pilots’ position as victims). 
On February 9, 2001, two and a half months before becoming Prime Minister of Ja-
pan, Koizumi Junichiro¯ visited the Peace Museum in Chiran.  Surrounded by the pho-
tographs, diaries, and letters of young pilots, Koizumi was literally moved to tears. 
Three years later, a man who had also visited Chiran and shed tears over the plight of 
the kamikaze wrote a letter to Asahi shinbun, protesting Koizumi’s commitment to 
sending Japanese troops to Iraq.  To the author of the letter, Koizumi’s political deci-
sion was unacceptable because it violated the hermeneutics of suffering—the assump-
tion that all the Japanese, living or dead, unite in the sentiment that they all suffered 
the war’s terrible consequence.  The prime minister’s decision to send Japanese troops 
to Iraq would be incompatible with this sentiment for it would cast Japan as an agent 
of a war act.  While claiming his sympathy with the deceased pilots, Koizumi was then 
following the footsteps of the militarists who had driven the young men to their pre-
mature deaths.  Furthermore, by acting as a defender of the United States’ interests in 
Middle East, Koizumi forcefully reminded the letter’s author of the U.S. presence, 
which had been completely dissociated from the operations in which the kamikaze en-
gaged.  The letter questions if Koizumi’s tears were genuine while intimating that its 
writer’s were unquestionably so.18)  Genuine tears are required to speak through the 
voice of the kamikaze.
Whether they belong to Koizumi or his detractor, the tears shed over the kamikaze 
serve an ideological function of annihilating the ﬁgure of the other.  The history of the 
kamizake has been transformed into a drama produced exclusively for domestic con-
sumption, in which the ﬁgure of the enemy completely disappears.  Japanese conﬁrm 
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their national identity through shedding tears over the plight of their fellow Japanese. 
Tears shed over the sorrowful fate of the kamikaze pilots mask the fact that the kami-
kaze missions were designed to maximize the damage to enemy ships and personnel. 
The effects of the attacks were construed largely as psychological in most of the post-
war Japanese representations.  To put it more bluntly, how many Japanese have shed 
tears over the Americans killed by the kamikaze?  Sympathy for the kamikaze has 
helped to produce an image of the war where the ﬁgures of American soldiers are pe-
culiarly missing.19)
Also absent is the possibility of understanding the kamikaze missions in relation to 
the contemporary practice of suicide bombings in other regions.  For example, there 
have been a number of emotional responses to the suggestion that the kamikaze were 
analogous to the 9/11 hijackers in their willingness to use themselves as weapons.  The 
writer Susaki Katsuya vehemently refutes the journalist Tachibana Takashi, who ﬁnds 
afﬁnities between the kamikaze’s almost religious dedication to their nation and the hi-
jackers’ extreme conviction.20)  Although directed to Tachibana, Susaki’s argument 
generally targets the outside (Western) gaze that has reduced the kamikaze to a gang of 
fanatics (Tachibana is guilty for accepting this outside view).  His rebuttal hinges on 
the point that the kamikaze pilots were not fanatics like the modern-day terrorists.21) 
In the body of his book, he attempts to instantiate that, unlike the brainwashed suicide 
bombers, the kamikaze pilots fully lived their lives under the extremely difﬁcult condi-
tion of the Asia Paciﬁc War and accepted their mission as their own.  Susaki urges his 
readers to humanize the image of the kamikaze through understanding their individu-
al experiences.  However, his concern does not extend beyond the national boundar-
ies: the Japanese are part of the civilized world where individuals exercise their free 
will, while the Middle Easterners are categorically denied entry there.  Susaki’s effort 
replicates the outside gaze and casts it on the hijackers.22)  By locating the ﬁgure of the 
inscrutable other outside of the national boundaries, he safely rescues the kamikaze 
from the stereotype.
Susaki’s insistence on humanizing the kamikaze is consistent with the ways in which 
they have been constructed as a national symbol in Japan.  As a metonymy of the na-
tionhood, the ﬁgures of the kamikaze demand sympathy from latter-day commenta-
tors, and Susaki is simply complying with this demand.  In the majority of recent pop-
ular expressions, the war against the Allied Powers looms in the background merely as 
a broad, undeﬁneable fear.  In the absence of an enemy ﬁgure, the kamikaze struggle 
with the rather abstract question of how one should behave when confronted with an 
insurmountable challenge.  For example, two kamikaze ﬁlms from the 1990s well ex-
emplify this absence through the ways in which they forcefully bring their cinematic 
narratives to conclusion.  Gekko¯ no natsu (1993) ends with a scene in which the protag-
onist is shot down to complete his image as an innocent music student incapable of 
harming others.  In the closing scene of Kimi o wasurenai: Fly boys, ﬂy (1995), the young 
pilots happily ﬂy away on their one-way mission to Okinawan waters.
Recent writings on the kamikaze continue to operate on the same discursive plane 
as previous works, though they may introduce a few new elements.  For example, the 
2001 account of two navy kamikaze pilots by the writer Shiroyama Saburo¯ is notewor-
thy for its effort to reconcile two conﬂicting desires in portraying the kamikaze.  Post-
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war liberal discourse, which has denounced Japan’s wartime legacies, tends to mini-
mize the strategic contribution of the kamikaze: unskilled pilots hardly ever reached 
the enemy targets.  On the other hand, conservatives ﬁnd solace in the kamikaze mis-
sions’ psychological effects on the enemy.23)  Shiroyama ﬁnds a way to satisfy both 
ways of representation by ﬁnding the value in their ineffectiveness as weapons.  Shi-
royama infers that Nakatsuru Tatsuo intentionally missed the target of his kamikaze 
mission on August 15, 1945, after the emperor announced Japan’s acceptance of the 
Potsdam Declaration, and insists that, through his sabotage, Nakatsuru made a great 
contribution to postwar Japanese society.
Taking creative license, Shiroyama describes a scene in which Nakatsu learns about 
the end of the war and begins to question the wisdom of the mission that Navy Vice 
Admiral Ugaki Matome had designed while he is ﬂying the admiral’s plane.  Although 
Ugaki ordered him to crash the plane into the U.S. base in Okinawa, Nakatsuru turns 
left and avoids the target at the last minute.  Based on this guesswork with little evi-
dential support (the only support that he provides is the fact that he visited the site), 
Shiroyama concludes that Nakatsuru’s last-minute decision saved Japan from a poten-
tial disaster.  The war that started with Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would 
have ended with another surprise attack.  The author is thankful to Nakatsuru for 
avoiding the situation in which “Japan would have received world-wide criticism, and 
… the imperial institution would have been shattered.” 24)  Nakatsuru’s decision had 
much the same effect as former prime minister Hirota Ko¯ki’s testimony in the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East, in which he accepted all political responsibili-
ty for the war to protect the emperor.
It is highly unlikely that, even after the acceptance of the peace terms, an isolated 
attack without ofﬁcial sanction would have had the universal effects of the Pearl Har-
bor attack.  Through his ﬁctional account, Shiroyama attempts to evacuate the kami-
kaze from the war, while recasting them as the foundation of postwar Japan.  By grant-
ing the subjectivity to defy the unreasonable order (and thereby refusing to harm the 
enemy), the author resurrects Nakatsuru (and other kamikaze pilots by extension) as a 
hero who sacriﬁced his life for the well-being of his country.  Shiroyama’s maneuver is 
also an effort to reconﬁrm the kamikaze’s heroism as a Japanese drama.  This point is 
illustrated by his reference to a postwar incident, in which a Self-Defense Forces pilot 
died in a crash.  He managed to crash his F-104J away from residential areas, while 
missing the opportunity for bailout.25)  In Shiroyama’s strange equation, avoiding an 
enemy target acquires the same meaning as sparing the lives of Japanese residents. 
What matters in the end is not so much the fate of Allied personnel per se as the pi-
lots’ willingness to save Japanese lives (and Japan) at the expense of their own lives.
The media images of September 11 that portrayed Americans as victims of violence 
perhaps afforded a new perspective on the kamikaze in Japan.  Ogiwara Hiroshi’s 
Bokutachi no senso¯, written in the wake of the event, is not insensitive to the pain and 
suffering caused by the kamikaze attacks.  Yet, despite the author’s efforts to break out 
of the conventional style of the kamikaze tales, the story ultimately conforms to the 
desire to tell a domestic story of a heroic kamikaze.  To make his historical drama ap-
pealing to his contemporary readers, Ogiwara premises it on a fantastic trans-temporal 
identity switch between two young Japanese males.  On September 11, 2001, nineteen-
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year-old Ojima Kenta is swept by a large wave while surﬁng in the waters of Ibaraki. 
On the same day of 1944, a 19-year-old navy aviation trainee, Ishiba Goichi, acciden-
tally crashes his plane into Kasumigaura also in Ibaraki.  Although they both survive 
their mishaps, they eventually realize they traded their places in history.  Ogiwara ef-
fectively uses the narrative device of time-slip in describing how the two worlds—the 
Japans in 1944 and 2001—are different places.  Goichi struggles to survive the sensory 
overload in 2001 Japan, while Kenta experiences beating as the way of the Japanese 
military in 1944.
The time warp alienates the Ogiwara’s readers from contemporary Japan, while 
making Japan of six decades ago seem familiar.  However, despite the surface changes, 
the essential quality of Japan remains constant.  This continuity of Japanese identity is 
assured not merely by the two interchangeable characters—they are physically identi-
cal—separated by ﬁfty-seven years but also by a female character, Kamoshida Mina-
mi, with whom both men have a relationship.  Goichi takes the place of Kenta as Min-
ami’s boyfriend without ever letting her know of the switch.  (Meanwhile, Kenta ends 
up meeting both Minami’s grandmother and grandfather, as well as his grandfather, in 
1944.)
While Goichi begins to enjoy his life with Minami, Kenta is forced to be a Kaiten 
pilot and receives training for his suicide mission.  Each man tries to ﬁnd his way back 
to his world and eventually succeeds in returning to his proper place in history.  On 
August 16, 1945, Kenta volunteers to man a Kaiten in order to save the submarine he 
is aboard and its crewmembers, facing the threat of an American destroyer.  On the 
same day of 2002, Goichi searches for a passage back to 1945 in the Okinawan sea. 
Throughout the story, Kenta refuses to embrace the war and his Kaiten mission until 
the last minute when he realizes that he is saving not just a ship and its crew but also 
the future of Japan.  Among the men on board are his grandfather and the man who is 
destined to marry Minami’s grandmother.  Kenta loses consciousness as his Kaiten 
crashes into the American ship.  On the other hand, Goichi is stuck on the bottom of 
the sea as his wetsuit is caught in a coral reef.  The story’s end intimates that Goichi 
dies in the Kaiten mission while Kenta returns to 2002 to resume his original life. 
However, Kenta’s life has changed forever: Minami is pregnant with Goichi’s child. 
Kenta returns home to raise Goichi’s legacy.26)
At this point in the book, the reader may notice interesting structural afﬁnities be-
tween Ogiwara’s story and the Hollywood ﬁlm, Pearl Harbor, in which the love rivalry 
of Danny and Rafe is resolved in a very similar fashion.  Although killed by Japanese 
soldiers in China after a crash landing, Danny leaves his legacy through a child with 
Evelyn.  In the ﬁnal scene, Rafe happily lives with her and the child in Tennessee, 
where the story had begun.  Perhaps as a symbol of the innocence that the United 
States has allegedly lost in the war, Danny has to be killed in action.  Yet his legacy is 
fostered and passed onto the next generation by his closest friend.  The ﬁnal scene of 
Pearl Harbor concludes the story of loss and recovery, rendering its war story as a pure-
ly American drama.  The female character as a procreator in the end reassures the 
continuity of the masculine drama of the nation.  Similarly, in Ogiwara’s story, Goichi 
dies as a metonym of the old Japan to secure the tie between the two Japans separated 
by six decades.  However, through Kenta, Minami, and Goichi’s own child, his legacy 
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will live on among the later generation of Japanese.  The vastly different experiences 
from 1944 are deemed comprehensible to Japanese today on the ground that they laid 
the foundation of the present.  The rather opportunistic link found between 1944 and 
2001 presupposes a shared identity of being Japanese that transcends history.
Although Ogiwara’s ﬁction extends its descriptions to the enemy ﬁgures, the refer-
ences to them are made only in passing.  The book offers a more detailed and con-
vincing picture when Kenta critically reﬂects on his own role in perpetuating the cycle 
of violence in his unit.  After initiating the beating of his superior, he soon regrets the 
use of violence as he discovers his own dark impulse.27)  As long as the story is en-
cased in the narrative that focuses on the resonance between the two Japans, it is hard-
ly possible to confront the enemy in a serious manner.  Kenta sees the enemies 
through the Kaiten’s periscope right before the crash.  Their ﬁgures are just as mediat-
ed and ephemeral as images on a TV screen: the story does not describe what hap-
pens to them when and after he rams his torpedo into the ship.  In the end, the story is 
best read as a moral tale of Sturm und Drang for today’s Japanese youths.  The book’s 
ending, where Minami waits for Kenta to share the news of her pregnancy intimates 
that Kenta, who begins the story as an unemployed 19-year old with no realistic vision 
of his future, returns to 2002 as a “man” who can take responsibility for his life.
Muticultural Kamikaze
Although the popular imaginations of the United States and Japan produced sepa-
rate sets of kamikaze images, these images complement each other while fulﬁlling ide-
ological functions in each nation.  In the United States, the kamikaze as one of the 
most visible icons of Japan has served to trap its people under an essentialist notion of 
culture.  Japan as a cultural form has been reduced to a set of crude cultural traits from 
World War II.  As crude as it is, this essentialist construction of Japan has provided a 
degree of comfort to many of its residents; it secures a place in the (multi-)cultural 
framework.  Although Japan has happily accepted the United States’ diagnosis for its 
cultural symptoms (the kamikaze), it has claimed unique relations with those symp-
toms (through complaining of the lack of true knowledge in the United States and 
elsewhere).
Given how entangled images of kamikaze have become in U.S.-Japan relations over 
the past sixty years, there is no easy way to escape the ideological effects of those im-
ages.  Even a sincere effort to humanize the young men who participated in the kami-
kaze missions merely reinforces the framework in which each image ideologically op-
erates.  One can perhaps begin to undo their effects by imagining what these images 
have concealed in the postwar history of the two countries, with the understanding 
that this will not merely be a work to augment the existing kamikaze images but also 
an exercise to grapple with the forces that have created and maintained these impov-
erished images.
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